There are plenty of examples of pilots who simply take the wrong decisions by the stress to prevent or get out of a stall.For example Aeroflot Flight 593, the pilots kept trying to get the control of the plane back, while the only thing they had to do is release the control. This is because planes are designed to automatically return to the optimal position. Another example is Air France Flight 447, in which the pilots continued to pull the nose up instead of pushing it down, to generate lift over the wings again.
Figure 1: CS 25.1309 (b) (European Aviation Safety Agency, 2018)
The fact that a malfunction leads to a catastrophic crash should not be possible, this is also in the requirements of the EASA (European Aviation Safety Agency) (see Figure 1). It is therefore the intention that the systems of the aircraft are designed so that the probability that the system fails is very small. In order to certify an aeroplane, certain requirements must be fulfilled, although other rules apply to already certified types.
Boeing did not have to re-certify the whole 737 MAX (or Airbus de A320 neo), since most of the aircraft remained the same. Unfortunately, this is causing problems if a new system exercises influence on another system, while this new system was not there first and so 脙1/4berhaupt could not cause any problems.
The problem, however, is that as with Auto芒 鈧劉 s There are also additional options for airplanes that are not necessary.There are also several failsafes. However, why some of these failsafe components are also covered by the optional stuff is a mystery to me, as often a single run system will cause problems faster if that system fails.
European Aviation Safety Agency.(2018, 5 November). Certification specifications and acceptable means of compliance for large aeroplanes (CS-25)-Amendment 22. Retrieved 5 February 2019, from https://www.easa.europa.eu/document-library/certification-specifications/cs-25-amendmend-22
Because at that time it was the best solution for a problem.
Personally, I wonder why there was no built-in failsafe.
An additional option on the 737max is an AOA disagree warning light.It is a difference between the AOA sensors of more than 10 degrees for 10 seconds. The Lion Air 737max would have had a 20 degree difference between the AOA sensors during or during multiple flights. In an error, a failsafe system would not only do the disagree light but immediately deactivate the anti stall system for the rest of the Vllucht and the reason why it is stored somewhere in a computer.