Is the definition of knowledge in philosophy unrealistic? Given that philosophers still disagree on the definition and after following the ‘ Science Wars ‘ it seems that philosophers are laying the bar too high for the definition of knowledge.

The science Wars was a conflict between two broad ideas.On the one hand, there were the realists, those who believe that empirical observation leads to objective theories converging to one true knowledge. This group also defends a stricter scientific method or methods and rejects knowledge that does not comply with it. On the other hand, you have a diverse group, which are mainly collected under the label postmodernists but are actually broader that that, who believe that science is at least partly a social construct.

Both ‘ camps ‘ are partly the same.Denying that science is partly a social construct seems to me absurd, and in that respect I agree with that interpretation of Kuhn. However, you don’t have to think so deeply about it; For example, cancer research is allocated much more resources because it has a greater social interest than research into the demise of certain slag species in Hawaii. Certain matters are socially much more acceptable to study and publish than others and will also receive more attention and funds.

Moreover, it does not seem unreasonable to say that our empirical observations are influenced by our strengths and weaknesses of our senses seem absurd.We look at the world by our human beings in a certain way (cf. Side). If dogs were to do science, smell would play a much bigger role than is the case now.

It is also not possible to say that we approach the objective truth, because to defend such a theorem you must first know the truth, and that leads to a contradiction.A certain modesty seems to me to be in place here.

On the other hand, it is natural that many of these modern disciplines, including ‘ feminist studies ‘ and ‘ cultural studies ‘, are often on a very shaky basis.It is not because science is therefore not 100% objective and independent of social influences, that no qualitative distinction can be made between good science and pseudo-intellectual nonsense.

Often, the disciplines that are criticized by the scientific realists are a kind of ‘ perpetual discussion ‘ of terms that they themselves invent ad infinitum, without any outward reflection whatsoever taking place.However, this could also be said about the (pure) mathematics, which in many cases proved to be very useful.

A little broader, this conflict is simply a manifestation of a much broader cultural conflict between ‘ physical sciences ‘ and ‘ humanities ‘, as described by C.P. Snow in his essay of 1959 ‘ The Two Cultures ‘.In a sense, the science wars are just an extreme manifestation of this.

To come back to the original question: it is a hallmark of the philosophy that it deals with questions that have not yet reached a consensus on the method of treating them.

The science wars were also about a demarcation criterion between ‘ real science ‘ and pseudo-science than about the definition of knowledge -although of course there is a link.As far as the demarcation criterion is concerned, it seems to me that there is generally a (limited) consensus that relies on Popper’s falsification criterion (it must be possible to defy a theorem).

The problem “What can we know?”, the core question of epistemology (knowledge doctrine), is much broader than this.For example, there is the Gettier issue, which is often illustrated by the example of a stationary clock that indicates 12 hours. Coincidentally it is also twelve o’clock. If we conclude by reading the clock that it is 12 o’clock, is this ‘ true knowledge ‘?

In practice, philosophers do not impose the bar unless they are those who share the money.Money determines where the bar lies, which in my opinion is a bigger problem. It often leads to ‘ clickbait articles ‘ (yes, also in academic journals this phenomenon exists) and not always 100% impartial studies, as mentioned above. The pressure to publish leads to fraud and negligence.

Philosofen will never agree.That is their function. If they cease to ask questions then they have made themselves redundant. Asking questions is their job in society. When society agrees-at long last-it is their task to question that. Like science.

Knowledge is a word.Using words to describe abstract concepts is, by definition, doomed to failure. If you let this also be done by an international symposium, you will get further translation problems.

There are sometimes days of meeting about one word in an annual report for a company.There are weeks of long months of discussions at international level about the translation of words into the Bible. For example, the word used to indicate that the heavens and the earth were separated from each other. Synonyms for the possible words mean in current languages not everywhere the same.

It is not in the nature of mankind to ever agree.

The disaster is only complete if all philosophers are the one with each other.Then it stops thinking and development, then it stops pushing at the limits of what we know. And development. So as long as we have good philosophers that will never happen.

The bar for knowledge cannot be too high anyway!? After all, that bar also bases itself on knowledge!

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