No.The decisions are understandable afterwards but the biggest mistake of Germany was to startthe war.
During the First World War, the strategy was not able to win (especially In the longer term) but there was still a strategy.Hitler did not have that in principle, he had a vague idea of Weltanschauung, further collaborators who ‘ met ‘ him, and a certain gamblers instinct with which he had always had success since the 20s.It always came down to the advantage of the short term as much as possible. Several times he has come away also because he had the conditions, such as the Beer Halle Putsch, the deflecting of various crises in his party, the Night of the Long Knives, the Blomberg-Frischscandal, and his International political and military successes.In Many cases it could also have been quite different. Hitler could have suffered irreparable loss of sight by Rohm, Blomberg or Fritsch. The Anschluss and other annexations would have failed if the Allies had been more unified and more combated.A the France had all the chances to defeat Germany in 1938 and 1939. Ciano was not far apart when he wrote in 1940 on Hitler’s peace proposal to the Allies, he was the gambler who had beaten his battle and now wanted to get up from the table to collect his winnings. Unfortunately for Hitler the other players refused that and they forced him to finish the game. To look for confrontation with different powers, how politically divided and little decisive as well, is madness. Similar to a man who fights in a pub with 3 stronger opponents. When he is in the back with a chair, he can do a lot of damage with a bit of luck and the element of surprise and turn off an opponent but in the longer term he loses the fight.
In that, the industrial base of Germany, although impressive, did not get it against its opponents.If it had been only Germany against the USSR or against the British Empire there was still a little bit. But behind these two countries the USA stood with an unrivalled production capacity. Even with occupied Europe under the thumb Germany would not save it for it is not a secret that humans under compulsion perform less than out of free will. In addition, military occupation is siding military capacity of the occupying forces. A quarter of the German Army in 1941, 39 divisions, was stuck in occupied Europe to keep it under the thumb. Again the scenario of the pub fighter: A man can still beat you, three no more.
Moreover, National Socialism does not encourage innovation.The Nazi regime was incredibly corrupt and you came especially ahead if you were politically good and you had the right boyfriends. In The USA you could also get ahead if you did your job well. This is an incentive that encourages people to increase production. Even now, the countries where production per capita is the largest, are the countries with the highest democratic content. The emergence of the authoritarian China masks that this attendance possible work by political reforms of Deng Xiaoping. The deomcratic South Korea is an economic superpower, the authoritarian North Korea arm as the nits (certainly the north would be able to defeat the South in the long term without third intervention, but it would be a Pyrrhus victory). The root is always a better motivator than the stick. I doubt that a regime like that of Hitler with its homes has a real long-term prospects. And perhaps that is a reason behind military aggression: Germany evolved into a ‘ predatory state ‘ that could exist as a swarm of grasshoppers only by eating other countries bald.
Only if it succeeded to conquer the oilfields of the Caucasus.England was not the problem. Production either. Fuel shortage is what with distance the Nazi War Machine neked. Therefore they could no longer enter wars in the ways they were accustomed to. Their reservations were at the end 1941. That was possibly a more important reason that their attack crashed than the Russian winter.
It is a misconception of many historians to conclude that Hitler had poor strategic insight and his generals were tied to hands and feet.On the contrary: Hitler usually knew much better what the essence was. Moscow was a side issue, the Ukraine and especially the oilfields had to be conquered super fast. That failed twice and then the end was exercise.
Germany was very dependent on horses (and pilfered bikes from the Netherlands) for transport.Some experts even advised to make the army less mechanical to conserve fuel. The Germans also had to supply the fuel in occupied Europe, which was an extra block on their leg.
Eye-Openers for inmates (English)
Surprise other people with your modern insights about World War II, this guy has done his homework
Bonus: The baloney of historians and the chatter of German generals unmasked. (English and feel for sarcasm needed).A textbook example of misinformation of historians, based on “accurate” information from German generals.
Answer from Cornelis Zandbergen on what has been Hitler’s most erroneous strategic decision in WWII?And would the Third Reich still have existed if those mistakes had not been?
What part of their history are the Dutch least proud of?Has it been deleted from the history books?
With hindsight, Germany could have won it.When they had not been blindstaged on certain strategic issues such as Stalingrad (although the choice at the time was a logical one, since Stalingrad had a huge production capacity) and had avoided a two-pronged war.
The chance was also minimal.At the time the US started interfering with the war (it already supported the Allies with the lease deals) it was over. The production capacity mentioned earlier is what the war has determined. While Hitler had less or not fixated on special ‘ Wunderwaffen ‘, they could not have produced the SU, US and GB.
Not the war as it began in September 1939.For the following reasons:
- Britain was still a world power that had 25% of all the land on earth under its authority.
The country itself was still in industrial superpower and possessed a huge fleet capable of blocking the European continent.
The number of you booting was not sufficient in 1939 to halt trade between Britain and the rest of the world.
That’s why Germany sent to fast campaigns. In Poland, France and Norway succeeded. In England and Russia it was already established that a Blitzkrieg would be stuck.
And certainly to keep a war economy running. This was evident during the Napoleonic Wars when Europe was literally exhausted under the continental system and the British blockade.
This factor ensured that even a despot like Stalin was prefered above Germany. Racism also led many German scholars to leave Germany.
In the most probable case, sooner or later the US would participate in the war on the Allied side.
If the Germans had put everything on a much larger fleet of you booting and much larger strategic oil resources, they would have had a greater chance of keeping it up until the years 芒 鈧?虄 50.
Yes, that is not entirely unthinkable, if Hitler had less to interfere with it.By Hitler’s impatience, the war began too early, so the Germans were not ready for the conflict, Hitler could have just ignored England, then there was no longer much to do on the Western Front after 1940.
The big question is his attack on the Soviet Union had been able to defeat.That is where he eventually lost the war. He had a comfortable non-attack treaty with Stalin, which he could have been able to do. Stalin certainly would have begun nothing against Hitler.
Hitler is again personally responsible for the mistakes made in the attack on the Soviet Union.If he had prepared himself better, and followed a better tactic, he would undoubtedly have had much better opportunities.
But then you may wonder if the Soviets could not have been able to turn the tide at any time.
Germany had already won.
Occupation of the Saarland?Won.
Well, and then you go on.If Germany stopped in 1939 Wad, then Germany Jn 1949 had been the dominant power in Europe. Instead of a European Union, we had a Pax Germania.
Playing war against the three biggest and strongest countries in world was just stupid.
WWII became inevitable when both the West and the Soviet Union around ‘ 38 came to the insights that appeasement and similar politics were not working.One began to rearm also. Thereby for Hitler Germany began to tap the clock. Around ‘ 43 The west and the Soviet Union would have been militarily no longer to defeat. That is why things happened as they went. Germany only had the chance to convert her (dating) lead to a military fair accompli for her opponents. So fast strike was commanded. The only real chance the Germans had was smothered in the Winter War of 41/42, because the Red Army was a mess in terms of its organization. To the war in the Soviet Union I believe that if one had not applied the breed, one could have let millions (!) imprisoned Russian or-Soviet soldiers fight against the Stalin Regime, if then not with German equipment. Later in the war, a half-hearted attempt was made with the ZG Vlassov units, but this was far too late and far too little. The people who welcomed the Wehrmacht initially as liberators became partisans when the deeds of Einsatzgruppen and the very poor treatment of the people and prisoners of war were manifested. The fact that the Ural Bomber project was being discontinued prematurely ensured that the Soviet war production, after relocation to the Barbarossa behind the Ural mountains, could get undisturbed on steam. The organic organisation of Luftwaffe lacked the possibility of carrying out long-distance bombing, by the fact that no strategic capacities were built. After the Winter War 41/42 it was only a matter of time that Germany would be sharing it. Victories after the beginning ‘ 42 the inevitable only slowed down.